An information-theoretic approach is used to determine the amount of information that may be safely transferred over a steganographic channel with a passive adversary. A steganographic channel, or stego-channel is a pair consisting of the channel transition probabilities and a detection function. When a message is sent, it first encounters a distortion (due to the channel), then is subject to inspection by a passive adversary (using the detection function). This paper presents results on the amount of information that may be transferred over an arbitrary stego-channel with vanishing probabilities of error and detection.
INTRODUCTION

Background
Shannon's pioneering work provides bounds on the amount of information that can be transmitted over a noisy channel. His results show that capacity is an intrinsic property of the channel itself. This work takes a similar viewpoint in seeking to find the amount of information that may be transferred over a stego-channel as seen in Figure 1 .
The stego-channel is equivalent to the classic channel with the addition of the detection function. For the classic channel, a transmission is considered successful if the decoder properly determines which message the encoder has sent. In the stego-channel a transmission is successful not only if the decoder properly determines the sent message, but if the detection function is not triggered as well.
This additional constraint on the channel use leads to the fundamental view that the capacity of a stego-channel is an intrinsic property of both the channel and the detection function. That is, the properties of the detection function influence the capacity just as much as the noise in the channel.
Previous Work
There have been a number of applications of information theory to the steganographic capacity problem [11, 12] . These works give capacity results under distortion constraints on the hider as well as active adversary. The additional constraint that the stego-signal retain the same distribution as the cover-signal serves as the steganalysis detection function.
Somewhat less work exists exploring capacity with arbitrary detection functions. These works are written from a steganalysis perspective [1, 10] and accordingly give heavy consideration to the detection function.
This work differs from previous work in a number of aspects. Most notable is the use of information-spectrum methods that allow for the analysis of arbitrary detection algorithms. This eliminates the need to restrict interest to detection algorithms that operate on sample averages or behave consistently. Instead the detection functions may be instantaneous, that is, the properties of a detector for n samples need not have any relation to the same detector for n + 1 samples.
Another substantial difference is the presence of noise before the detector. This placement enables the modeling of common signal processing distortions such as compression, quantization, etc. The location of the noise adds complexity not only because of confusion at the decoder, but also a signal, carefully crafted to avoid detection, may be corrupted into one that will trigger the detector.
Finally, the consideration of a cover-signal and distortion constraint in the encoding function is omitted. This is due to the view that steganographic capacity is a property of the channel and the detection function. This viewpoint, along with the above differences, make a direct comparison to previous work somewhat difficult, although possible with a number of simplifications explored in Section 6. 
Random Variables
Random variables are denoted by capital letters, e.g. X. Realizations of these random variables are denoted as lowercase letters, e.g. x. Each random variable is defined over a domain denoted with a script X . A sequence of n random variables is denoted with X n = (X1, . . . , Xn). Similarly, an n-length sequence of random variable realizations is denoted x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n . The probability of X taking value x ∈ X is PX (x).
The space of all channel inputs (stego-signals) is denoted X and the space of channel outputs (corrupted stego-signals) is Y. Similarly the space of n-length channel inputs and outputs are denoted as X n and Y n respectively.
Detection Function
Definition 1. The steganalysis detection function is a function gn : Y n → {0, 1} that classifies a channel output into one of two categories: containing steganographic informationf and not containing steganographic information.
The function is defined as follows for all y ∈ Y n ,
The specific type of function may be that of support vector machine or a Bayesian, etc. When no confusion can occur, g is written in place of gn.
Definition 2.
A detection function sequence is denoted as,
where gn :
The set of all n-length detection functions is denoted Gn.
Permissible Set
For any detection function gn, the space of signals Y n is split into the permissible set and the impermissible set, defined below. Definition 3. The permissible set, Pg n ⊆ Y n , is the inverse image of 0 under gn.
That is,
Figure 2: Permissible and Impermissible Sets
The permissible set is the set of all channel outputs that the given detection function, gn will classify as non-steganographic.
As a detection function is completely specified by its permissible set, we may describe a detection function sequence as,
where Pn ⊆ Y n is the permissible set for gn. That is,
Impermissible Set
For a given gn the impermissible set is the set of all channel outputs that gn will classify as steganographic. Note that two sets are related as follows,
The permissible set and impermissible set are shown in 
Memoryless Detection Functions
is one where each gn is defined for y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn) as,
where g ∈ G1 is said to specify gn (and g).
To denote a detection function sequence is memoryless the following notation will be used g = {g}.
For a memoryless detection function g = {g}, we have that,
Pg.
That is, the permissible set of gn is defined by the n-dimensional product of Pg.
Channels
The channel is denoted as W n where W n : Y n × X n → [0, 1] and has the following property for all x ∈ X n ,
The channel represents the conditional probabilities of receiving y ∈ Y n when x ∈ X n is sent, that is W n (y|x) := P Y n |X n (y|x).
The random variable, Y , resulting from transmitting X through the channel W will be denoted as Y = W (X) or the relation reinforced by noting X W → Y .
Definition 6.
A general channel is a sequence,
where each W n is the n-length channel transition probability.
In the case where channel distortions act independently and identically on each input letter xi, we say it is a memoryless channel. In this instance the n-length transition probabilities can be written as,
where W is said to define the channel. To denote a channel is memoryless and defined by W we will write W = {W }.
Encoder and Decoder
The purpose of the encoder and decoder is to transmit and receive information across a channel. The information to be transferred is assumed to be from a uniformly distributed message set denoted Mn, with a cardinality of Mn.
The encoding function embeds a message into a stegosignal. That is, fn : Mn → X n . The element of X n that the ith message maps to is called the codeword for i and is denoted, ui. That is,
The collection of codewords, Cn = {u1, . . . , uM n } is called the code. The rate of an encoding function is given as,
The decoding function, φn : Y n → Mn, maps a corrupted stego-signal to a message. The decoder is defined by a set of decoding regions: D1, . . . , DM n . The decoding regions are disjoint sets that cover Y n and are defined such that,
for m = 1, . . . , Mn. Next, two important terms are presented that allow for the analysis of steganographic systems. The first is the probability of error and the second is the probability of detection. In both cases they are calculated for a given code C = {u1, . . . , uM n }, channel W n , and impermissible set Ig n (corresponding to some gn).
The probability of error can be found as,
Similarly the probability of detection is calculated as,
Stego-Channel
Definition 7. A steganographic channel or stego-channel is a pair (W, g), where W is a general channel and g is a detection function sequence.
To reinforce the notion that a stego-channel is defined by a sequence of pairs we will typically write (W, g) = {(W n , gn)} ∞ n=1 . Definition 8. A discrete stego-channel is one where at least one of the following holds: |X | < ∞, |Y| < ∞, or |Pg n | < ∞ ∀n.
g is memoryless
A DMSC is said to be defined by the pair (W, g) and will be denoted (W, g) = {(W, g)}.
Steganographic Capacity
Definition 10. An (n, Mn, ǫn, δn)-code (for a given stegochannel) consists of an encoder and decoder. The encoder and decoder are capable of transferring one of Mn messages in n uses of the channel with an average probability of error of ǫn and a probability of detection of δn.
Definition 11. A rate R is said to be securely achievable for a stego-channel (W, g) = {(W n , gn)} ∞ n=1 , if there exists a sequence of (n, Mn, ǫn, δn)-codes such that:
Definition 12. The secure capacity of a stego-channel (W, g) is denoted as C(W, g). This is defined as the supremum of all securely achievable rates for (W, g).
Definition 13.
A rate R is said to be (ǫ, δ)-securely achievable for a stego-channel (W, g) = {(W n , gn)} ∞ n=1 , if there exists a sequence of (n, Mn, ǫn, δn)-codes such that:
Definition 14. The (ǫ, δ) secure capacity of a stego-channel (W, g) is denoted as C(ǫ, δ|W, g). This is defined as the supremum of all (ǫ, δ)-securely achievable rates for (W, g).
SECURE CAPACITY FORMULA
Information-Spectrum Methods
The information-spectrum method [5, 6, 7, 8, 13 ] is a generalization of information theory created to apply to systems where either the channel or its inputs are not necessarily ergodic or stationary. Its use is required in this work because the detection function is not assumed to have any ergodic or stationary properties.
The information-spectrum method uses the general source (or general sequence) defined as,
where each X (n) m is a random variable defined over alphabet X . It is important to note that the general source makes no assumptions about consistency, ergodicity, or stationarity.
The information-spectrum method also uses two novel quantities defined for sequences of random variables, called the lim sup and lim inf in probability.
The limsup in probability of a sequence of random variables, {Zn} ∞ n=1 is defined as, p-lim sup Zn := inf The spectral sup-entropy rate of a general source X = {X n } ∞ n=1 is defined as,
Analogously, the spectral inf-entropy rate of a general source
The spectral entropy rates are the information-spectrum counterparts to the Shannon entropy and share a number of its natural properties. For instance, H(X) ≥ H(X) ≥ 0 for any X [7, 13] .
The spectral sup-mutual information rate for the pair of general sequences (X, Y) = {(X n , Y n )} ∞ n=1 is defined as,
where,
Likewise the spectral inf-mutual information rate for the pair of general sequences (X,
The spectral mutual information rates share a number of properties with the classic mutual information such as I(X; Y) = I(Y; X) ≥ 0 [7, 13] . A number of useful inequalities for the spectral mutual information are listed in Appendix A.
A rate R (for a general channel W) is said to be ǫ-achievable if there exists a sequence of (n, Mn, ǫn)-codes such that:
is the supremum of ǫ-achievable rates.
Secure distributions
or either of the equivalent conditions,
The set of all general output sequences that are δ-secure outputs is denoted T δ , that is,
Definition 16. The set of all δ-secure outputs for δ = 0 is called the secure output set and denoted T0.
The set of all general sources that are δ-secure inputs is denoted S δ , that is,
Definition 18. The set of all δ-secure inputs for δ = 0 is called the secure input set and denoted S0.
(ǫ, δ)-Channel Capacity
We are now prepared to derive the first fundamental result: the (ǫ, δ)-Channel Capacity. This capacity will make use of the following definition,
Theorem 1 ((ǫ, δ)-Channel Capacity). The (ǫ, δ) channel capacity of a stego-channel (W, g) is given by,
for any 0 ≤ ǫ < 1 and 0 ≤ δ < 1.
Proof. From [7, 13] we have that for the general channel W the ǫ-capacity is,
In order for the probability of detection δn → 0, we must restrict the channel inputs to the δ-secure input set, thus the sup is restricted to X ∈ S δ .
Secure Channel Capacity
The next result deals with a special case of (ǫ, δ)-capacity, namely the one where ǫ = δ = 0. The secure channel capacity is the maximum amount of information that may be sent over a channel with arbitrarily small probabilities of error and detection.
Theorem 2 (Secure Channel Capacity). The secure channel capacity of a stego-channel (W, g) is given by,
Proof. We apply Theorem 1 with ǫ = 0 and δ = 0. This gives,
Here the last line is due to the definitions of p-lim inf and the spectral inf-information rate.
Strong Converse of Secure Capacity
A stego-channel (W, g) is said to satisfy the strong converse property if for any R > C(W, g), every (n, Mn, ǫn, δn)code with, 
Proof. A general channel satisfies the strong converse if and only if [7, 13] ,
By our constraint we have that δn → 0, thus the sup is over the secure input set.
Maximum Bounds
We now derive a number of useful bounds on the spectralentropy of an output sequence in relation to the permissible set. These bounds will then be used to prove general bounds for steganographic systems.
Theorem 4 (Spectral inf-entropy bound). For a discrete g = {Pn} ∞ n=1 with corresponding secure output set T0,
for any γ > 0. This means that,
By (28b) we have H(Y * ) = lim infn→∞ 1 n log |Pn| and from the definition of lim inf we may find a subsequence indexed by kn such that,
For any kn (31a) holds and we have,
Applying (30) to this result we have,
(32) Rearranging the inner term we have,
Thus given any ǫ > 0 there exists n0 such that when n > n0,
Let,
so for all n > n0,
For n > n0 we may calculate the probability of the 
for all ǫ > 0 so clearly,
is impossible. Thus from (19) we have a contradiction as the above implies that Y / ∈ T0.
Theorem 5 (Spectral sup-entropy bound). For discrete g = {Pn} ∞ n=1 with corresponding secure output set T0,
The proof is similar to Theorem 4, and given in Appendix B.
Capacity Bounds
This section presents a number of fundamental bounds on the secure capacity of a stego-channel based on the properties of that channel.
The first gives an upperbound based on the sup-entropy of the secure input set.
Theorem 6 (Input Sup-Entropy Bound). For a stegochannel (W, g) the secure capacity is bounded as,
Proof. Using Theorem 14 and the property that H(X|Y) ≥ 0 we have,
The following corollary specializes the previous result with the restriction that the input alphabet is finite.
Corollary 1. For a given stego-channel (W, g) with a discrete input set (|X | < ∞) the secure capacity is bounded from above as,
Proof. We make use of Theorem 6,
The next theorem gives two upper bounds on the capacity based on the sup-entropy of the secure input and output sets.
Theorem 7 (Output Sup-Entropy Bounds). For a stego-channel (W, g) the secure capacity is bounded as,
Proof. Using Theorem 14 and the property that H(Y|X) ≥ 0 we have,
Here the final line follows since if X ∈ S0 then Y = W(X) ∈ T0.
The next corollary specializes the above theorem when the permissible set is finite.
Corollary 2 (Discrete Permissible Set Bound).
For a given discrete stego-channel (W, g) = {(W n , Pg n )} ∞ n=1 the secure capacity is bounded from above as,
Proof. Combining Theorem 5 and line (44b) of Theorem 7 gives the desired result.
The next theorem provides an intuitive result dealing with the capacity of two stego-channels having related detection functions. Proof. Let {fn} ∞ n=1 and {φn} ∞ n=1 be a sequence of encoding and decoding functions that achieves C(W, g). Such a sequence exists by the definition of secure capacity. It suffices to show that this sequence is secure for C(W, v).
The following definitions will be used for i = 1, . . . , Mn, ui = fn(i),
.. The probability of error for this sequence is given by (9),
Clearly, this value is independent of the permissible sets and if ǫn → 0 for the stego-channel (W, g) then it also goes to zero for (W, v).
Next we know that the probability of detection for (W, g) is given by (10),
W n (Ig n |ui) , and that δ g n → 0. Since Pg n ⊆ Pv n for all n > n0, we have that, Ig n ⊇ Iv n if n > n0 and thus, W n (Ig n |x) ≥ W n (Iv n |x) , ∀n > n0, x ∈ X n . (48)
Using this we may bound the probability of detection for (W, v) and n > n0 as,
Since δ g n → 0 we see that δ v n → 0 as well.
NOISELESS CHANNELS
This section investigates the capacity of the system shown in Figure 3 . The system is a special case of the general passive adversary shown in Figure 1 with the condition that there is no noise after the encoder.
This section finds the perfectly secure capacity of this system, and then derives a number of intuitive bounds relating to this capacity. We begin with a definition of the noiseless channel.
Noiseless Channel
Consider the case where there is no distortion after the embedding, that is Y n = X n . If this is true, the channel transition probabilities reduce to,
In this case both the detection function and the decoder receive the stego-signal exactly as the encoder has constructed it. If W n is noiseless for all n then the general channel W = {W n } ∞ n=1 is said to be a noiseless channel. Definition 19. A stego-channel (W, g) is said to be a noiseless stego-channel if W is noiseless.
Noiseless Channel Information-Spectrum Properties
This first Lemma shows that due to the noiseless property, the spectral mutual information rate and the spectral entropy rate coincide.
Lemma 1. For the noiseless channel W, and any general source
Proof. Since W n (x|x) = 1 for all x ∈ X n and X n = Y n we see that,
So the spectral inf-mutual information rate reduces to,
Similarly for the spectral sup-mutual information rate,
The second useful Lemma is an extension of Theorems 4 and 5 under the noiseless conditions. It shows the relation between the supremum of the spectral entropy rate for secure-inputs and the permissible set size.
Lemma 2. For a discrete noiseless stego-channel defined by g = {Pg n } ∞ n=1 ,
Proof. As the channel is noiseless we have that X = Y and S0 = T0 so we may apply Theorems 4 and 5 for the desired results.
Secure Noiseless Capacity
The majority of the work in deriving a formula for the secure capacity of a discrete noiseless system has been done in Theorem 4 (Lemma 2) and Lemma 1. These results are combined with the general secure capacity formula of Theorem 2 in the following fundamental formula.
Theorem 9 (Secure Noiseless Capacity). For a discrete noiseless channel (W, g) = {(W n , gn)} ∞ n=1 the secure channel capacity is given by,
Proof. By Theorem 2 we have,
Where the final two lines are due to Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 respectively.
Strong Converse for Noiseless Channels
We now present a fundamental result for discrete noiseless channels regarding the strong converse property. It gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for a noiseless stegochannel to satisfy the strong converse property.
Theorem 10 (Noiseless Strong Converse). A discrete noiseless stego-channel (W, g) satisfies the strong converse property if and only if,
exists. Furthermore the secure capacity is equal to this limit,
Proof. First assume that the stego-channel satisfies the strong converse property. By Theorem 3 we have,
This gives,
Here the equality of (65a) is due to Theorem 9, (65b) is by assumption, (65c) is by Lemma 1, and (65d) is from Lemma 2.
This shows that,
For the other direction assume that C(W, g) = limn→∞ 1 n log |Pg n | thus we have, C(W, g) = sup 
Capacity of the Noiseless DMSC
In this section we briefly investigate the secure capacity of the discrete memoryless stego-channel.
Theorem 11 (Noiseless DMSC Secure Capacity). For a noiseless DMSC defined by g = {g} the secure capacity is equal to,
and furthermore this stego-channel satisfies the strong converse.
Proof. As the channel is noiseless and the input alphabet is finite we may use Theorem 9,
Note that by (7) we have for all n,
Thus, C(W, g) = log |Pg| .
We also have that, C(W, g) = lim inf n→∞ 1 n log |Pg n | = log |Pg| = lim n→∞ 1 n log |Pg n | , (73) thus by Theorem 10 the stego-channel satisfies the strong converse. 
NOISY EXAMPLE
In this section we evaluate the capacity of particular stegochannel. The channel is the commonly studied additive white Gaussian noise one. The detector is motivated by the use of spread spectrum steganography [9] or more generally stochastic modulation [4] .
Additive Gaussian Channel
The channel to be considered is called the additive white Gaussian noise channel and is shown in Figure 4 . For a stego-signal, x = (x1, . . . , xn), the corrupted stego-signal is given by,
where each ni ∼ N (0, σ 2 ), and all are independent.
The transition probabilities of this channel are given by,
Variance Detector
In stochastic modulation a pseudo-noise is modulated by a message and added to the cover signal. This is done as the introduction of noise in signal processing applications is a common occurrence.
If the passive adversary has a knowledge of the distribution of the cover-signal and knows that the hider is using stochastic modulation, they also know that the variance of a cover-signal will differ from the variance of a stego-signal. If the passive adversary knows that the variance of the coverdistribution they could design a detector to trigger if the variance of a test signal is higher than this threshold.
For example, when testing the signal y = (y1, . . . , yn) the variance detector operates as,
Thus, if the empirical variance of a test signal is above a certain threshold, the signal is considered steganographic.
Channel Properties
Let N = {N } denote the channel noise where each N is i.i.d. Gaussian with zero mean and variance σ 2 . For a general source X = {X n } ∞ n=1 define the general source of their sum as N + X := {N n + X n } ∞ n=1 . Using this notation the corrupted stego-signal is expressed as Y = N + X.
Since N is independent of X we have that,
This gives the following useful simplification,
Secure Capacity
We now derive the secure capacity of the above stegochannel.
Theorem 12. For the stego-channel (W, g) = {(W n , gn)} ∞ n=1 with W n defined by (74) and gn defined by (75) the secure capacity is,
Proof. Achievability: Using Theorem 15 to show a lowerbound on the secure capacity,
Here line (78d) is due to the additive noise simplification of (76). Now assume that X is i.i.d. Gaussian with variance of c − σ 2 . So for Y = X + N we have that Y is i.i.d. Gaussian with variance c. From this we have that X ∈ S0 since,
(79) Also note that the inf-entropy of Y is,
Applying this result to (78e) we see,
Converse:
To find the upperbound we will make use of a number of simple lemmas:
. For the stego-channel defined above, if Y = {Y n } ∞ n=1 ∈ T0 we have for any γ > 0 there exists some n0 such that for all n > n0,
Proof. To show this assume that no such n0 exists, thus we have a subsequence n k such that,
This means that,
which in turn implies that,
This is a contradiction in that Y = {Y n } ∞ n=1 ∈ T0.
Lemma 4. For any Y ∈ T0 and any ǫ > 0 we have,
Proof. Let any ǫ > 0 be given and choose γ > 0 such that, γ ≤ c e 2ǫ − 1 ¡ , this gives,
For all but a finite number of n we have,
where we have used the fact that for any Y n = (Y
we have [2, Chap. 9.6] ,
as well as the arithmetic-geometric inequality in (87).
We now show the upperbound:
Here line (92b) is due to the fact that for any X ∈ S0, we have Y = W(X) ∈ T0. Next, line (92c) is from Theorem 16 and the inequality of (92f) is due to Lemma 4.
Thus combining (81c) and (92g) we have for any ǫ > 0,
and we see that C(W, g) = 1 2 log c σ 2 .
COMPARISON TO PREVIOUS WORK
Cachin Perfect Security
In Cachin's definition of perfect security the cover-signal distribution and the stego-signal distribution are each required to be independent and identically distributed. This gives the following secure-input set,
The i.i.d. property means that D (S n ||X n ) = nD (S||X) so we see that the above is equivalent to,
Since Cachin's definition does not model noise, we may consider it as noiseless and apply Theorem 9,
This result states that in a system that is perfectly secure (in Cachin's definition) the limit on the amount of information that may be transferred each channel use is equal to the entropy of the source. This is intuitive because in Cachin's definition the output distribution of the encoder is constrained to be equal to the cover distribution.
Empirical Distribution Detection Function
The empirical distribution detection function is motivated by the fact that the empirical distribution from a stationary memoryless source converges to the actual distribution of that source. Accordingly, if a test signals empirical distribution converges to the cover-signal distribution it is considered to be non-steganographic.
Assume that PS is a discrete distribution over the finite alphabet S. Let a sequence, {s n } ∞ n=1 with each s n ∈ S n be Encoder Decoder Noise
Source Detection 
where P [x] is the empirical distribution of x. The permissible set for gn is equal to the type class of P [s n ] , i.e., (98)
Moulin Steganographic Capacity
Moulin's formulation [12] of the stego-channel is shown in Figure 5 . This is somewhat different than the formulation shown in Figure 1 , most notable is the presence of distortion constraints and an active adversary. Additionally there is an absence of a distortion function prior to the detection function. Also in this model the detection function is fixed as the previously discussed empirical distribution detection function. The sequence of s n to specify the detection function is drawn i.i.d. as S. In order to have the two formulations coincide a number of simplifications are needed for each model. For our model, Theorem 13. For the stego-channel shown in Figure 6 , the capacities of this work and Moulin's agree. That is,
Proof. Since the channel is noiseless we may apply Theorem 9.
Here we have used the fact that the permissible set for the empirical distribution detection function is the type class in (100b). Additionally, by Varadarjan's Theorem [3] , P [s n ] (x) → PS(x) almost surely (here the convergence is uniform in x as well). This allows for the use of the type class-entropy bound from Appendix C that provides the final result. We now show Moulin's capacity is equal to this value. In the case of a passive adversary (D2 = 0), the following is the capacity of the stego-channel [12] , Here (106c) is becauseX and S are independent (PX S (x, s) = PX (x)PS(s)).
CONCLUSIONS
A framework for evaluating the capacity of steganographic channels under a passive adversary has been introduced. The system considers a noise corrupting the signal before the detection function in order to model real-world distortions such as compression, quantization, etc.
Constraints on the encoder dealing with distortion and a cover-signal are not considered. Instead, the focus is to develop the theory necessary to analyze the interplay between the channel and detection function that results in the steganographic capacity.
The method uses an information-spectrum approach that allows for the analysis of arbitrary detection functions and channels. This provides machinery necessary to analyze a very broad range of steganographic channels.
In addition to offering insight into the limits of performance for steganographic algorithms, this formulation of capacity can be used to analyze a different, and fundamentally important, facet of steganalysis. While false alarms and missed signals have rightfully dominated the steganalysis literature, very little is known about the amount of information that can be sent past these algorithms. This work presents a theory to shed light onto this important quantity called steganographic capacity.
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Rewriting we have, lim n→∞ Pr PȲ kn (Ȳ kn ) < e −knγ |P kn | = 0 (116)
Let,
A kn := y ∈ X n : PȲ kn (Ȳ kn ) < e −knγ |P kn | (117) and given any ǫ > 0 we may find n0 so for n > n0,
For n > n0 the probability of the permissible set (in this subsequence) is, PȲ kn (P kn ) = 
for any ǫ > 0. Since the subsequence above does not converge to 1 it is impossible for, lim n→∞ PȲ n (Pn) = 1,
and by (19) we see Y / ∈ T0.
